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FROM FAILING HANDS. By JoHN D. FEERICK. New York:
Fordham University Press. 1965. Pp. 368. $6.95.
From Failing Hands, aptly provocative in its title, and scholarly
and entertaining throughout its several hundred pages, presents the
drama, the history, and the legal and political problems involved in
presidential succession in the United States.
This book by Mr. Feerick1 could scarcely be more timely. Coming
off the press in early 1965, it antedated by several months the passage
of a proposed constitutional amendment2 on presidential inability
and vice presidential vacancy by the 89th Congress of the United
States. It should serve as a stirring and authoritative source of in-
formation and analysis to state legislators and private citizens during
the ensuing ratification processes and the public debates in the states
of the Union.
Well known even to school children is the fact that throughout
the history of the United States executive power has passed blood-
lessly and almost instantaneously to the vice president upon the
death of a president. Yet, how many people know that the framers
of our Constitution probably intended a vice president to become
only an "Acting President" when a president died in office? John
Tyler in 1841 upon the death of William Henry Harrison established
the precedent that a vice president succeeds as "President" to such
an unexpired term.
Nevertheless, the Tyler decision to become "President," based on
an interpretation of article II, section 1, clause 54 of the Consti-
tution, would doubtless have horrified the "Committee on Style" of
the Constitutional Convention. This "Committee," however, certainly
1 A member of the Advisory Committee of the American Bar Association's Special
Committee on Presidential Inability and Vice-Presidential Succession.
2 CONG. Rlc. S. J. Res. 1, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., III CONG. REC. 15028 (1965)
(proposed 25th Amendment).
8 Thus avoiding "the intestine shock, and furious close of civil butchery" Shakes-
peare, Henry IV, Part One, Act 1, Scene 1.
4 "In case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation,
or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall
devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of
Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President,
declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly,
until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected."
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facilitated Tyler's interpretation by an ambiguous condensation of
two separate sections into one (pp. 48-51).
Certainly incalculable good has flowed from the prompt assump-
tion by vice presidents of both the offices ind the powers and duties
of the eight presidents who have died in office (App. A). Several
times a president has died when major crises,5 national or interna-
tional, have faced the nation. An executive, possessed of only tem-
porary authority and disturbed by the uncertainties and vagaries of
some sort of impromptu special presidential election, would need
to be superhuman to make wise decisions.
Mr. Feerick, in his introduction, sketches the dramatic events in
Dallas on November 22, 1963. The assassination of President Ken-
nedy, the swearing-in of President Johnson, and the competent,
thorough steps taken by the new chief executive are all vividly
portrayed. The effective passing of the baton of leadership empha-
sized both the practical value of the Tyler tradition and the wisdom
of President Kennedy's program of sharing executive department
problems with Vice President Johnson. Not by "potent art ' but by
knowledgeable, prearranged study of domestic and international
problems can our vice presidents ably replace in this atomic age a
president who dies in office.
Thus, the perpetuation of the Tyler precedent has enabled our
executive department to function well. But suppose a president is
only disabled, mentally or physically, or both? There exists no clear
constitutional provision for temporarily transferring executive power
to the vice president when the president is unable to carry out his
duties. Article II, section 1, clause 57 of the Constitution exacts from
the vice president the same obligations when the president dies as
when he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office.
Historically, vice presidents have been loath to step in and act for
a disabled president; they have not wished to be usurpers. Further-
more, by acting, they possibly would be permanently depriving the
president of his office even after the disability no longer existed.
Chapter 9 of Mr. Feerick's book discusses at great length the first
case of presidential inability. President Garfield, shot four months
5 Witness President Truman's problem in April, 1945 with the nation engaged in a
global war, and the cold war matters requiring President Johnson's decisions in
November, 1963.
0 Shakespeare, The Tempest, Act V, Scene 1.
7 See note 4 supra.
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after his inauguration by Charles Guiteau, hovered between life and
death for almost three months. No real executive duties were per-
formed by President Garfield between July 2, 1881, and his death
on September 19 of that year. Chester A. Arthur, then vice president,
refused to become acting president, even though as time dragged on
Garfield's entire cabinet requested him to do so.
History is replete with incidents involving the replacement, usurpa-
tion, or overthrow of crowned heads, but in our democracy every
vice president confronted with a deteriorating executive department,
directly caused by presidential inability, has refused to step into the
breach. At President Eisenhower's request, at the very beginning of
his first term, Vice President Nixon had an expanded role in execu-
tiye matters, but he "walked on eggs" during President Eisenhower's
convalescence following a heart attack in 1955 (pp. 221-23).
SIn 1958 President Eisenhower developed a written agreement
covering any future disability he might have (p. 228). This agree-
ment, essentially called for the President to declare, if he were able,
his own disability to perform the powers and duties of his office. If
unable to so communicate, then the Vice President with such con-
sultations as he deemed desirable would act as president until the
inability had ended. Finally, the President would decide when he
would resume his duties and powers.
Substantially this same written agreement was adopted by Presi-
dent Kennedy and Vice President Johnson and later by President
Johnson and Vice President Humphrey (pp. 228-29). Such an agree-
ment does not, of course, have the force of law; furthermore, it could
be countermanded at any time by a president who might become
suspicious of the motives and good intentions of the vice president.
As an analogous example, President Wilson was largely unable
to perform the duties of his office during the last year and a half of
his second term. Vice President Marshall, despite many suggestions
from the Cabinet and others that he act as president, firmly refused
to do so. With serious domestic and international problems needing
solution, Secretary of State Lansing frequently called together the
Cabinet for conferences and discussions. Eventually President Wilson
demanded Secretary Lansing's resignation for "assumption of Presi-
dential authority" (p. 177). Whether or not this was the real motive
for the request is not too clear. At any rate, it shows the potentially
ephemeral nature of a written agreement of the type developed by
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President Eisenhower, especially if the incumbent president should
be impaired in judgment by virtue of his inability or for other
reasons.
Mr. Feerick discusses (pp. 248-57) the pros and cons of methods
for determining the inability of the president. Separation of powers,
power politics, governmental cliques are all involved. The American
Bar Assocation's "Conference Consensus" (App. D) represents a
major non-political solution of the problem, a solution substantially
embodied in the proposed 25th amendment.8
Another related problem, discussed in detail in chapter 20, in-
volves the need for, and the method of, filling the office of vice presi-
dent when that official becomes president, dies, resigns, or otherwise
creates a vacancy. The nation for over twenty per cent of its existence
(p. 258) has been without a vice president. Sixteen vice presidents
(App. A) have not completed their terms; seven of these vacancies
existed for more than three years. The Constitution has no provision
for this contingency; article II, section 1, clause 5 authorizes Con-
gress to "declare what Officer shall then act as President" when both
the president and the vice president are unable to be the chief
executive.
Perhaps in the eighteen hundreds the nation could sputter along
without a vice president. Today, a vice president's embryonic exec-
utive role looms highly important. The high stakes being played in
international politics demand a named, knowledgeable substitute
always ready on an instant to play a dead or disabled president's
hand. Sharp debates occurred in Congress prior to July 6, 1965,1 as to
how, by whom, and from what ranks a new vice president would be
designated whenever a vice presidential vacancy occurred. Of major
importance, however, is the recognition of the problem and the estab-
lishment of constitutional ways to settle it.
Finally, Mr. Feerick's book contains much more than can ade-
quately be discussed in a book review. He lists a dozen pages of select
bibliographical material; his footnotes are legion; his discussion of
succession provisions of American colonies, states of the Union, and
modern foreign nations is scholarly and interesting. He remains ob-
8 Of interest is the fact that the Chairman of the American Bar Association's Special
Committee on Presidential Inability and Vice Presidential Vacancy is Herbert Brownell,
the Attorney General during President Eisenhower's inability in 1955.
9 The date of the passage of the proposed 25th amendment. Twenty states had
ratified the proposed amendment as of February 8, 1966.
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jective throughout the book by presenting the arguments for and
against the issues and problems inherent in the subject matter of
his book.
From Failing Hands is fascinating. It is filled with anecdotes. It
moves. Here and there it achieves a sort of "Who-Done-It" urgency.
I found that I preferred to read it again and again rather than take
the time to write about it.
GEORGE W. HICKmAN, JR.*
* Member of the Bar, District of Columbia.
